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COMMENTS
THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT:
CONGRESS TAKES A BYTE OUT OF THE NET
Matthew G. McLaughlin'
To understand the complexities of Internet taxation, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical: John is looking for a new television set. After
browsing at several retailers in his area, he returns home and logs on to
the Internet. While on-line, John finds the Web-page of the out-of-state
manufacturer of the television he wants to purchase; in fact, the set is
selling for one hundred dollars less than at the local store. John sends his
secured credit card number across the Internet and, in less than two
weeks, the set arrives on his doorstep.
If John had purchased his new television from a local retailer, in al-
most every state, he would pay a state-imposed sales tax.' If he had pur-
chased his set from a retailer outside of the state, the state in which he
lived would most likely impose a use tax in lieu of collecting a sales tax.2
Because John purchased his television from an on-line company out-of-
state, however, he avoided paying either tax. Or did he? What if John
did not buy a television, but instead purchased software or commenced a
service contract on-line?
The United States Constitution invests all power to regulate interstate
+J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (stating that forty-five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia impose some form of sales tax).
2. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Tax § 189 (1993). A sales tax is levied on in-
state transactions, whereas a use tax is imposed on out-of-state transactions that otherwise
would be subject to a sales tax had they been consummated in-state. See id. A use tax,
thought of as a complement to a sales tax, is designed to prevent evasion of the sales tax.
See id. But see James Eads et al., National Tax Association Communications and Elec-
tronic Commerce Tax Project Report No. 1 of the Drafting Committee, 13 STATE TAX
NOTES 1255, 1263 (1997) [hereinafter NTA Report] (suggesting that different treatment of
use taxes in the multi-jurisdictional context may prevent them from operating always in a
complementary fashion).
The statutory provisions of both taxes generally are similar, and at least one court has
found it unnecessary to differentiate between the two. See Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 135 P.2d 927, 932 (Wyo. 1943) (finding that the State legislature in-
tended to apply the same rules and principles to sales and use taxes, as evidenced by the
lack of contrary language in the statute).
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commerce with Congress.' Further, the Supremacy Clause ensures that
all laws made pursuant to the Commerce Clause preempt state action.4
Despite the fact that nothing in the Constitution gives Congress power
over intrastate commerce, courts have expanded the scope of Congress's
commerce power to reach activity with little apparent interstate contact
State power, even in the realm of purely intrastate commerce, is not un-
fettered however, but is restricted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia impose a sales tax-a
levy on commerce conducted within the state's borders-on items in
commerce These same states also impose a use tax on goods and serv-
ices purchased out-of-state but destined for in-state consumption.8 Un-
der typical use tax statutes, consumers who purchase out-of-state goods
for use in-state are responsible for calculating the applicable use tax and
remitting that amount to the state.9 Consumers rarely comply with the
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the exclu-
sive power to "regulate [c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes[.]" Id.
4. See id. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws... which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... "); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (explaining that "the word 'to regulate' [in the
Commerce Clause] implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, [and] it
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on
the same thing").
5. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding that because a
substantial portion of food served at a restaurant had moved in interstate commerce, and
because the restaurant served interstate travelers, the Commerce Clause could be em-
ployed to eliminate racial discrimination at a restaurant); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
127-28 (1942) (holding that the collective effect of farmers storing wheat for personal use
would be adverse to interstate commerce and could, therefore, be regulated under the
Commerce Clause).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[njo State shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
7. See David C. Blum, Comment, State and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking More
Than Their Fair Share of the Electronic Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 493, 494 n.6 (1996). The remaining five states, Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Oregon, while not imposing a "sales tax" per se, impose some type
of tax on purchases. See id.
8. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6201 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-
30(a), (c) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-6 (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5741.02 (Anderson 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-210 (1994); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.101 (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-604 (Michie 1997).
9. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-6 (statute imposing use tax); § 54:32B-12 (re-
quiring collection of use tax); § 54:32B-18 (directing methods for payment of tax collected
under § 54:32B-12); see also 144 CONG. REC. S230 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Bumpers) (stating that sales and use taxes are payable whether the purchase was
made at the store, through the mail, or on-line).
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law, because they are often unaware that a tax exists; thus, to collect the
back taxes, the state would have to pursue the multitude of individuals
who are buying goods from out-of-state vendors for use in the taxing
state. ° As an alternative, states have sought to impose the responsibility
to collect and remit use taxes on the vendors themselves."
Before a state can charge vendors with a responsibility to collect and
remit sales and use taxes on transactions, however, it must have legal
authority, or jurisdiction, over the actors in commerce." In order to ob-
tain this jurisdiction to tax, the state must satisfy certain requirements
under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses; specifically, it must dem-
onstrate that the vendor has sufficient contact within its borders. 3 Typi-
cally, a court will find jurisdiction to tax where the commercial actor, by
establishing retail facilities in the taxing state, appeals specifically to the
consumers there.14 This jurisdictional analysis becomes difficult in situa-
tions where the connection between the taxing state and the commercial
actor is attenuated, such as when goods and services are sold over the
Internet."5 A number of states have enacted laws that require businesses
selling goods on the Internet to collect sales and use taxes on the prod-
ucts they sell and then to remit the amounts to the state in which the con-
. 16
sumer lives. With the value of Internet transactions approaching six
10. See 144 CONG. REC. S230. In introducing Senate Bill 1586, the Consumer and
Main Street Protection Act of 1998, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) cited the billions of
dollars lost each year by state and local governments because of uncollected use taxes. See
id. This delinquency is due in part to most mail-order companies not informing their cus-
tomers of their legal obligations or misleading them into believing that no obligation ex-
ists. See id. Senate Bill 1586 attempts to alleviate this problem by authorizing states to
impose use tax collection burdens on out-of-state vendors. See S. 1586, 105th Cong. § 3(a)
(1998).
11. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992) (seeking to impose use
tax collection responsibilities on an out-of-state vendor).
12. See Christina R. Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Stan-
dards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 894-95 (1996).
13. See id. at 895.
14. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941) (upholding Iowa's
requirement that companies collect use taxes from in-state consumers when they maintain
facilities in the state).
15. See Edson, supra note 12, at 893 ("State revenue agencies... have been forced to
apply outdated statutes and court decisions ... when analyzing the taxation of companies
that... do not have the traditional 'physical presence' within the state .... ).
16. See Tim Huber, State, Local Governments Looking for Access to Potential Inter-
net Tax Dollars, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, April 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 259457 (de-
scribing existing state statutes that impose taxes on various transactions completed over
the Internet); see also Matthew Petrillo, Tax Law Changes Will Hit Telecom Companies of
All Types; State Battlegrounds Emerging, STATE & LOC. COMM. REP., August 8, 1997, at
4-5 [hereinafter Tax Law Changes] (describing the current debate regarding Internet taxa-
tion and noting that Tennessee and Texas already tax Internet commerce).
1998]
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billion dollars per year by the end of this century, states are racing to
grasp this new source of revenue."
Because each jurisdiction employs a tax rate independent of the others
however, a business is faced with the administrative burden of calculating
and reporting the sales and use taxes for each state that taxes its Internet
• 18
business. Moreover, in some cases, the only contact that a seller may
have with the taxing state is the phone line that enables the consumer to
log on to the Internet.' 9
Due in part to both the administrative confusion and amount of reve-
nue at stake, the Federal Government has taken notice of state action in
this area.2° The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), recently signed into
law by President Clinton, imposes a moratorium on certain new taxes on
Internet transactions." In addition, the Department of the Treasury
17. See Gregg Keizer, Online Money Matters, COMPUTER LIFE, August 1996, at 46,
available in 1996 WL 7987471. In addition to a 6V4% state sales tax, if users dial a Texas
phone number or a toll-free number within the state to access an Internet access provider,
local governments can add a 2% local tax. See Huber, supra note 16, at *1. A spokesman
for the Texas Comptroller's office characterized Internet access "'as a taxable telecommu-
nications service."' Id.
Although it is unclear what long-term action, if any, Congress will take in the area of
Internet taxation, there has been much discussion about the ability of the states to absorb
fiscal responsibilities imposed by Congress in the current era of devolution and their cor-
responding need to secure new, viable sources of revenue. See Robert Tannenwald, Come
the Devolution, Will States Be Able to Respond?, 14 STATE TAX NOTEs 357, 357 (1998).
In his article, Tannenwald reports that some policymakers have expressed concern that
states will be unable to cope with new fiscal responsibilities due to public resistance to
higher taxes. See id. Tannenwald points out that the burden of general sales and property
taxes as a percentage of overall state and local revenue has increased since the 1980s. See
id. at 366. Moreover, as public demand declines for those consumable goods that consti-
tute more traditional sources of state tax revenue, such as gasoline, tobacco, and hard liq-
uor, the burden on other sales and property taxes increases. See id. at 365. States, how-
ever, are hesitant to broaden their tax bases through increased levies on corporations,
given the transient nature of today's business and competition from other states to attract
business within their borders. See id. at 366. This fact is evidenced by the trend by states
to tax the consumer (through a sales or use tax), and not the vendor, for goods and serv-
ices sold over the Internet. See id.; infra notes 166-171 and accompanying text (describing
different state paradigms for taxing information services and other intangible property).
18. See Blum, supra note 7, at 495-96.
19. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(finding by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut that it had ju-
risdiction where corporation's only contact with citizens of the taxing state was through an
advertisement posted on the Internet).
20. See Tax Law Changes, supra note 16, at 5.
21. See S. 442, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 1054, 105th Cong. (1997). Senator Ron Wy-
den (D-OR) introduced Senate Bill 442, known as the "Internet Tax Freedom Act." See
S. 442. Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) introduced companion legislation, desig-
nated House Bill 1054, in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 1054. The ITFA was
enacted as part of House Bill 4328, the omnibus appropriations legislation for fiscal 1999.
[Vol. 48:209
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anxiously is studying the issue and its potential for revenue growth."
This Comment addresses the Federal Government's role in the evolu-
tion of Internet taxation. First, this Comment examines the way states
obtain jurisdiction to tax an out-of-state actor in commerce. Noting the
similarities between the mail-order and electronic commerce industries,
this Comment analyzes case law concerning the taxation of mail-order
sales to infer the constitutional requirements of Internet taxation. This
Comment then considers state action in this arena, theories offered for
and against applying these requirements to Internet commerce, and fi-
nally, the impact that the ITFA will have in this regard. While this
Comment supports the ITFA, it argues for the adoption of a new stan-
dard that can be applied readily to Internet taxation.
I. THE EXPANSION OF STATE TAXING POWERS ON A NEW BREED OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE: INTERNET TRANSACTIONS
A. Limitations on the Jurisdiction to Tax: The Due Process and
Commerce Clauses
The greatest challenge to state taxation of Internet transactions is the
taxing state's ability to obtain jurisdiction to tax." This power is similar
to in personam jurisdiction, but differs in its focus and in the actors in-
volved.24 In personam jurisdiction must be obtained by a court prior to
asserting judicial authority over an individual. 5 Likewise, a state legisla-
ture must obtain taxing jurisdiction over individuals before it can collect
money from them in the form of taxes.26 Despite the difference in
authorities who seek to assert their jurisdiction, namely, the courts and
• • 27
the legislature, the constitutional standards for each inquiry are similar.
See H.R. 4328, 105th Cong., tit. XI, sec. 1100 (1998). President Clinton signed House Bill
4328 into law on October 21, 1998. See The Internet Tax Freedom Act Home Page (visited
Nov. 3, 1998) <http://www.house.cox.gov/chriscox/nettax>.
22. See generally Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce
(visited Mar. 3, 1998) <ftp://ftp.fedworld.gov/pub/tel/internet.txt> (discussing, in a paper
published in November 1996 by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Tax Policy,
federal income tax policy and administrative issues presented by developments in commu-
nications technology and electronic commerce).
23. See Edson, supra note 12, at 894-95.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 896. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional standards for
personal and taxing jurisdiction are not entirely the same. See id. For example, it has
been easier for a court to assert jurisdiction over a corporation than for a state to assert
jurisdiction to tax. See id. Furthermore, in obtaining personal jurisdiction, the Commerce
Clause is not implicated; however, in asserting taxing jurisdiction, the Commerce Clause
1998]
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It is useful, therefore, to examine briefly the evolution of personal juris-
diction jurisprudence and its application to Internet taxation.
1. The Due Process Clause and Erosion of the Minimum Contacts Test
A survey of the relevant caselaw on personal jurisdiction evinces a
move from rigid physical requirements to a more ephemeral standard.
Beginning with the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff,2 the Supreme
Court examined the Due Process Clause as a bar to asserting personal
jurisdiction over an individual who owned property in the state but did
no reside there.2 ' The Pennoyer Court held that due process required
that the defendant be within the sitting court's jurisdiction, by either
service of process within the state or voluntary appearance. ° More than
fifty years later, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,31 the Supreme
32Court reassessed Pennoyer's rigid physical presence requirement. The
Court held that if a defendant was not in the forum state, due process re-
quired only that he have "certain minimum contacts" with the state such
that asserting jurisdiction did not offend "'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.""'
joins the Due Process Clause in limiting the power of the states to act. See id.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
29. See id. at 733-34. In Pennoyer, Neff challenged a default judgment that had been
entered against him by asserting that he was not a resident of the state, was not personally
served with process, and had not appeared in court. See id. at 719-20.
30. See id. at 733. In requiring the physical presence of the defendant, the Court held
that default judgments entered against out-of-state defendants on the basis of mere publi-
cation of process would be, if upheld, "the constant instruments of fraud and oppression."
Id. at 726. Personal service was required, the Court held, because in most cases, absent
defendants never saw the published notices. See id.
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. See id. at 316. International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with approximately
one dozen Washington-based salesmen, challenged a Washington employment tax. See id.
at 313-15. It argued that its business affairs within the taxing state were insufficient to
amount to the presence required for the state to assert jurisdiction. See id. at 315. The
Supreme Court made only brief mention of the constitutionality of Washington's ability to
tax the corporation. See id. at 321. Following the Supreme Court of Washington and its
own precedent, the Court held that the taxation of labor within the forum state was a valid
exercise of state taxing power. See id. (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937)).
33. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In addressing the
unique nature of corporate presence, the Court held that
[slince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be
acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its "pres-
ence" without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say
that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process require-
ments, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts
of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or
[Vol. 48:209
Congress Takes a Byte Out of the Net
Even as the International Shoe Court's minimum contacts test gained
wide acceptance, the Court, in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.,34 continued to lower the constitutional hurdle.35 The International
Life Court ensured that due process jurisprudence would keep up with
economic progress by adopting a "substantial connection" test." It did so
because industrial improvements had made it easier to conduct business
with little contact with the forum state." Additionally, modern transpor-
tation enabled a company to travel with less difficulty to a forum state to
answer a complaint." Taking these factors into consideration, the Court
in International Life found that the insurance company had manifested a
substantial connection with California as the insured was a state resident
and her premiums were mailed from the state.39
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,4° the Court further
broadened International Life's substantial connection test to reach actors
who purposefully had availed themselves of the benefits and protections
of the forum state. 1 In addition, it examined the defendant's contacts
"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the de-
mands of due process. Those demands may be met by such contacts of the cor-
poration with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular
suit which is brought there.
Id. at 316-17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
34. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
35. See id. at 222 ("Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations and other nonresidents."). In International Life, a beneficiary under a life insur-
ance policy in California sued a Texas insurance company to collect under the policy. See
id. at 221. International Life argued that the judgment rendered against it in California
was not enforceable because the company had no office, no personnel, and only one policy
holder in California, and therefore lacked the minimum contacts required by International
Shoe. See id. at 221-22.
36. See id. at 223.
37. See id. Reflecting on the modernization of business, the Court recognized that
state jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and corporations was becoming increas-
ingly expansive. See id. at 222. The Court attributed this trend to a paradigmatic shift in
the method of business since the days of Pennoyer, where a strict physical presence in the
forum state was required to assert in personam jurisdiction. See id. The Court noted that
the "nationalization of commerce" had created a business atmosphere in which commer-
cial transactions traversed state boundaries and more business could be conducted by way
of the mails without any personal contact. See id. at 223. The result of the nationalization,
the Court found, was the relative ease with which a corporation could defend itself in a
state where it had no physical presence but engaged in economic activity. See id.
38. See id. at 223.
39. See id.
40. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
41. See id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In World-
19981
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with the forum state to determine whether they were such that he could
foresee being brought into court there.42 Although the Court held ulti-
mately that Oklahoma could not obtain jurisdiction over World-Wide
Volkswagen, its decision further weakened the Due Process Clause's pro-
tections over actors in interstate commerce by shifting the analysis from a
tautological examination of the defendant's contacts to one that focused
on that individual's reasonable expectations of being haled into court. 3
Five years after World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court, in Bur-
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 44 finally dismantled Pennoyer's rigid physi-
45cal requirements. In Burger King, the Court reasoned that, in cases
where an out-of-state actor in commerce conducted a substantial amount
of business through the mail and over wire services, it obviated the Due
•41
Process Clause's physical presence requirement. In so doing, the Court
rejected physical presence as a jurisdictional requirement when a corpo-
rate entity "purposefully direct[s]" its actions towards citizens of another
state.47
Wide Volkswagen, a New York resident brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma after
he was involved in a motor vehicle accident there. Id. at 288. In his suit, he named as co-
defendants the car manufacturer, its importer, its regional distributor, World-Wide
Volkswagen Corporation (a New York resident), and its retailer (also a New York resi-
dent). See id. World-Wide Volkswagen challenged the state court's exercise of its long-
arm statute over it for lack of personal jurisdiction on the bases that it was a New York
corporation, did no business in Oklahoma, did not ship or sell any products to that state,
did not have an agent there, and did no advertising there. See id. at 288-89.
42. See id. at 289. Although the Court held that the contacts between World-Wide
Volkswagen and Oklahoma were too attenuated to support a finding of jurisdiction, it
found that a non-resident corporation could be subject to suit in a forum state if its sales
arise from the efforts of the manufacturer to serve that state. See id. at 289, 297.
43. See id. at 292-95. The Court held that World-Wide Volkswagen had no contact
that would render it susceptible to jurisdiction in Oklahoma. See id. at 295. The Court
noted further that it had abandoned the "shibboleth" of Pennoyer's rigid requirements,
but did not expressly overrule the case. Id. at 293.
44. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
45. See id. at 476. The Court noted that, while the defendant's physical presence
within the state would enhance the state's ability to assert jurisdiction over the defendant,
the absence of physical presence did not preclude it from asserting such jurisdiction. See
id.
46. See id. In Burger King, a Florida corporation sued its Michigan franchisee for
breach of contract. See id. at 464. The defendant franchisee claimed that he was a Michi-
gan resident and, therefore, lacked minimum contacts with Florida. See id. The Court
held that Burger King's suit did not violate the Due Process Clause, because the franchise
agreement signed by the parties required payments to be sent to the corporate headquar-
ters in Florida and provided the defendant with notice that he might be haled into court
there. See id. at 480.
47. See id. at 476. The Court, quoting International Life, observed the economic
changes taking place that enabled businesses to conduct more business in the forum state
without being present there. See id. at 474. It then noted that, although a corporation's
[Vol. 48:209
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2. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: The Commerce Clause and
"Nexus" Theory
Pennoyer and its progeny were concerned with a court's ability to as-
sert jurisdiction over an out-of-state actor, and focused primarily on the
Due Process Clause as a limit on that power.48 A state that is seeking to
obtain jurisdiction to tax, however, also must be concerned with the
Commerce Clause's prohibition on interference with interstate com-
merce.4 9  Much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding state
taxation of interstate commerce, therefore, hinges on whether a state
places an undue burden on actors in that arena.' In much the same way
the International Shoe Court inquired into the existence of minimum
contacts, the courts that have addressed state taxation look to the suffi-
ciency of the connection, or nexus, between the state and the activity that
it seeks to tax. 1
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,52 the Supreme Court consid-
ered what it termed the "perennial problem" of determining the validity
of a state levying a tax on the "privilege of doing business" in that state. 3
In that case, Mississippi attempted to tax an out-of-state motor carrier
who brought motor vehicles to dealers throughout the state. The car-
rier, Complete Auto, challenged the Mississippi tax on constitutional
grounds; specifically, it argued that Mississippi's tax on the privilege of
physical presence in the forum state would "enhance a potential defendant's affiliation
with a [s]tate," the absence of such physical presence will not defeat jurisdiction per se. Id.
at 476.
48. See id. at 471-72; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 207 (1977); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires...
certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 728 (1877) (conducting a procedural due process analysis and concluding that "[n]o
person is required to answer in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose
property has not been attached").
49. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 178-80 (1995)
(evaluating whether a tax on interstate bus tickets violated the Constitution); Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1989) (determining whether a state telecommunications tax
was unconstitutional); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1941) (ques-
tioning whether a state tax placed a substantial burden on interstate commerce).
50. See generally Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 179-84 (tracing the development of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
51. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262-64 (finding that the only states with a sufficient
connection to impose a telecommunications tax were those where the call was charged and
those where it was billed or paid).
52. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
53. See id. (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 101 (1975)).
54. See id. at 275-76.
19981
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doing business within its borders violated the Commerce Clause.5
In support of its argument, Complete Auto cited Spector Motor Service
v. O'Connor," in which the Supreme Court held that a tax on the privi-
lege of doing business was unconstitutional per se when applied to purely
interstate commercial activity." The Complete Auto Court, however,
noted that the Spector rule had been questioned since its inception," and
ultimately overruled it.59 Instead, the Court held that a standard lower
than per se invalidity should be applied when considering taxes that are
tailored to the nature of the commerce involved. 6°
In Complete Auto, the Court drew a distinction between a tax on the
privilege of doing interstate business, which would be unconstitutional,
and a tax on the benefits and protections provided by the taxing state to
out-of-state actors operating in that state, which would be valid.61 It then
cited Justice Rutledge's four-part test, first offered in Memphis Natural
61Gas v. Stone, for determining whether a sufficient nexus exists between
the tax and the vendor's activity in the taxing state: whether (1) "the ac-
tivity [was] sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax;, 63 (2) "the
tax [was] fairly related to the benefits provided the taxpayer;" 64 (3) "the
55. See id. at 277. The Mississippi statute assessed "privilege taxes for the privilege of
engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state." MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 27-65-13 (1997).
56. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). In that case, Connecticut imposed a tax, measured by appor-
tioned net income, on the franchise of a Missouri trucking company for the privilege of
carrying on business within the state. See id. at 603. The Court held that a tax on the
privilege of doing business is unconstitutional if it is applied to commerce that is exclu-
sively interstate. See id. at 610.
57. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 283-84, 289.
58. See id. at 284-87; see also Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441
(1959) (holding that the Spector rule encouraged the use of semantics that could render an
otherwise valid tax unconstitutional).
59. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89. In overruling Spector, the Court noted
that the Spector rule "ha[d] no relationship to economic realities." Id. at 279.
60. See id. at 288-89 n.15.
61. See id. at 281-82 (citing Justice Reed's plurality opinion in Memphis Natural Gas
Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 88-93 (1948)).
62. 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
63. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. This question becomes the "nexus" issue that
courts must grapple with in determining whether the state can require an out-of-state ven-
dor to collect and remit use taxes. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Tax § 205 (1993).
64. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. Closely associated with the nexus theory, this
second requirement "is premised on whether the [forum] state has given anything for
which it can ask return." Great Am. Airways v. Nevada State Tax Comm'n, 705 P.2d 654,
658 (Nev. 1985). It is used to prevent a state from imposing collection and remittance re-
sponsibilities on a vendor if the vendor "does not benefit from services provided by the []
state." Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Marx, 594 So. 2d 615, 618 (Miss. 1992).
This requirement does not mandate an accounting of those state services beneficial to
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tax discriminate[d] against interstate commerce;"" and (4) "the tax [was]
... fairly apportioned,"66 that is, it was not applied to the activity con-
ducted outside the borders of the taxing state." Ultimately, the Court
found that it did not need to apply this test, because the sole issue raised
by Complete Auto on appeal was whether a tax "on the privilege of do-
ing business" was unconstitutional per se." Nevertheless, the sufficient
nexus test announced in Complete Auto became the standard for Com-
merce Clause analysis in the area of state taxation of out-of-state actors
• • •69
doing business in the state.
B. Application of Substantial Nexus Theory to the Mail Order Industry:
Bellas Hess and the Unified Test
The first prong of the Complete Auto test, whether a sufficient connec-
tion or "nexus" exists between the vendor and the taxing state, provides
a framework for the courts' analysis of jurisdiction in mail-order cases.7°
the vendor in any given transaction. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995). By the same token, the states are not required to allocate money
collected in use taxes to those services that the vendor enjoys. See id. The practical effect
of this requirement is that vendors engaging in interstate commerce may be made to pay
their fair share of state expenses from which they derive no direct benefit. See id. at 199-
200.
65. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. This prohibition forbids a state from taxing out-
of-state commerce at a higher rate than it taxes in-state commerce. See Great Am. Air-
ways, 705 P.2d at 658. A state's taxing strategy generally will survive if out-of-state taxes
are levied at the same rate as in-state taxes. See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511
U.S. 641, 648 (1994). In cases where the out-of-state taxes operate to discourage out-of-
state business in favor of those in-state, the Court has held such economic protectionism
invalid per se. See id. at 649-50 (holding that a discrepancy between the burdens imposed
by sales and use taxes discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional).
66. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287. In order for a state use tax to be fairly appor-
tioned, it must not be duplicative or subject to an already taxed activity, or incident to
double taxation. See Great Am. Airways, 705 P.2d at 657. A use tax must be structured so
that if every state were to impose a similar tax, there would be no multiple taxation. See
Tennessee Gas, 594 So. 2d at 618; Quotron Sys., Inc. v. Limbach, 584 N.E.2d 658, 660
(Ohio 1992) (holding that "if every state taxed the receipt of information via computer
equipment, as Ohio does, only one state, the state of receipt, would tax each transaction").
67. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 282. In Memphis Natural Gas, a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court held that the state was acting within constitutionally permissible limits
when it levied a tax on out-of-state companies for the protection afforded those companies
within the state's borders. See Memphis Natural Gas, 335 U.S. at 96. In his concurrence,
Justice Rutledge sustained the tax on the grounds that it was fairly apportioned, nondis-
criminatory, and did not subject the company to double taxation of its interstate activity.
See id. at 96-97 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
68. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89.
69. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing the elements of the
Complete Auto test and their application to later case law).
70. See Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases: Should the Mail
Order Industry Serve as a Model? 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 203, 214
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The mail-order industry serves as a useful analog to Internet commerce.71
In the same way mail-order consumers peruse a catalog, on-line shoppers
browse a vendor's Web-page. In both cases, consumers can order with-
out leaving their homes and can quickly receive wares shipped from out-
.73
of-state vendors via a common carrier.
As early as 1967, in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 74 the Court sought to determine whether a physical presence in the
taxing state was necessary for that state to have jurisdiction to tax.75 In
Bellas Hess, a Missouri mail-order company challenged an Illinois statute
requiring out-of-state mail-order companies to collect and remit use
taxes.6 Bellas Hess did not operate any facility in Illinoi. 77 In fact, its
only contact with the state was through the mail-order catalogs that it
sent to its customers by United States mail or a common carrier.78 How-
ever, under the relevant Illinois statute, even this limited contact with the
taxing state was sufficient to classify Bellas Hess as having a place of
business in the state.79
Bellas Hess challenged the Illinois statute on both due process and
Commerce Clause grounds.8 The Court considered both challenges, ac-
knowledging that the tests for validity in each case were closely related .
For due process concerns to be satisfied, the Court required that the
state justify its taxation of the seller on the ground that the seller is pay-
82ing for the benefits he receives from the taxing state. Implicitly under
this rule, the Court reasoned, the controlling question is whether the
seller has derived any benefit from the taxing state for which he can be
expected to pay." In its Commerce Clause analysis, the Court found that
(1997) (terming the first prong of the Complete Auto test "the most troublesome prong to
any state attempting to collect use tax from Internet vendors").
71. See id. at 204 (indicating the similarities between mail-order and Internet pur-
chaser conveniences).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
75. See id. at 754.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 755 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.2 (1965), that defined a
"[r]etailer maintaining a place of business in [the] State," to include those who
"[e]ngag[ed] in soliciting orders within [the] State from users by means of catalogues ...
whether such orders are received or accepted within or without [the] State").
80. See id. at 756.
81. See id.
82. See id. (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
83. See id. (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1962)); see also
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the states have used the same principles to justify requirements that the
seller collect and remit use taxes on interstate sales. 4 It noted that the
Constitution requires a minimum connection between the state and the
85
entity it seeks to tax.
The Court distinguished Bellas Hess from previous cases in which it
had allowed the state to impose a tax on the seller."' While the Court had
upheld the authority of the states to impose tax liability on interstate
sellers in the past, it had never held that a state may impose a burden on
a seller whose only contact with the state is through the United States
mail or a common carrierY The Court explained that, if it were to allow
the Illinois statute to stand, it would have to ignore this distinction.8 In-
stead, it reasoned that the distinction was valid and that there was no
commercial activity that was as purely interstate as the mail-order busi-
ness implicated in Bellas Hess.89 The Court struck down the Illinois stat-
ute, holding that both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses required
more than mere use of the mails; the seller must maintain some sort of
physical presence in the taxing state.90
In dicta, the Court posited that if it allowed Illinois to impose such a
burden, there would be nothing to stop every state from imposing the
same tax.91 Moreover, the Court noted, the administrative difficulties
posed by different tax rates, exemptions, and requirements on the inter-
state seller would bear little resemblance to the fair share of costs for the
benefits provided by the local government.9
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277 (1977) (noting that the Missouri
Supreme Court found that Complete Auto received a benefit from the taxing state in the
form of police protection of the general citizenry).
84. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
85. See id. (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)); see also
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1941) (upholding the state's
authority to tax a mail-order company where it maintained retail facilities in the taxing
state); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1939) (upholding the
state's power to impose liability on sales arranged by local agents in the taxing state).
86. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 759.
90. See id. at 758. The Court noted that
[iun order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens ... [it] would
have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which [prior Court decisions] have
drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within
a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State
by mail or common carrier ....
Id.
91. See id. at 759.
92. See id. at 759-60.
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In National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization,93
the Court considered whether National Geographic's presence in Cali-
fornia was a sufficient nexus to subject it to a tax. 94 The Court held that
California could constitutionally levy a tax on National Geographic, be-
cause the company, through its business activities, had established a rela-
tionship with the forum state."
National Geographic operated two offices in California, each staffed
with four persons.9' Although the primary function of these two offices
was to solicit advertising for the magazine, 97 California sought to tax the
sale of National Geographic's publications through its mail-order busi-
ness. 9s The California offices had made some over-the-counter sales of
similar merchandise; however, they had not carried on any activities re-
lated to the mail-order business.99 The California Supreme Court ruled
that when a company does a substantial amount of business through
mail-order, the slightest presence within the taxing state, even if it is un-
related to the mail-order business, will satisfy constitutional concerns.' °°
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that National Geo-
graphic was liable for the tax.'0 ' The Court noted however, that National
Geographic's connection to California was considerably higher than the
connection required by the slightest presence standard employed by the
lower court.'02 It therefore instructed that its decision to uphold the
lower court's ruling was not to be construed as an affirmation of the
slightest presence standard, but rather as a ruling based on National
Geographic's business presence in California satisfying the higher suffi-
cient nexus threshold.' 3
93. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
94. See id. at 554.
95. See id. at 556.
96. See id. at 554 & n.2.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 554. California requires "every retailer engaged in business in [Califor-
nia] and making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or other consumption
in [California]" to collect a use tax. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203 (West 1998). Cali-
fornia law also imputes liability for required taxes to the vendor regardless of whether he
collects the tax. See id. § 6204.
99. See National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 552.
100. See National Geographic Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equalization, 547 P.2d 458, 462
(Cal. 1976), aff'd 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
101. See National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 562 (holding that National Geographic's
"continuous" presence satisfied constitutional nexus requirements).
102. See id. at 556.
103. See id. The Court held that the amount of advertising revenue collected by the
two California offices constituted a nexus with the taxing state that belied the slightest
presence standard. See id.
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C. Splitting Due Process and Commerce Clause Analysis: Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota
Twenty-five years after Bellas Hess, the Court revisited the physical
presence requirement of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.'0 4 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a
North Dakota statute that imposed a tax-collection burden on an inter-
state seller in a situation very similar to that in Bellas Hess."'
Quill was a mail-order company that had facilities in Illinois, Califor-
nia, and Georgia.)° It had no personnel in North Dakota and did not op-
erate any warehouses in that state.' 7 North Dakota imposed a collection
and remittance requirement on vendors selling out-of-state merchan-
dise.' 8 In much the same manner as Bellas Hess,'09 the North Dakota
statute allowed the state to impose a use tax on vendors who solicited
sales within its borders, regardless of whether the vendor had an actual
location in the state."0
The Court in Quill departed drastically from its holding in Bellas Hess,
where it had found that the requirements under the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses were essentially similar."' Recognizing a fundamen-
tal difference in the concerns each clause addressed, the Court bifurcated
its analysis to determine the validity of the North Dakota statute; first
analyzing the due process concerns, then turning to a Commerce Clause
analysis."
1. Due Process Protection After Quill: Is Any Contact Really
Necessary?
In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Due Process
Clause to require some minimum connection between the business and
the taxing state."3 Although that connection may have become a bit at-
tenuated'14 by the time Bellas Hess was decided, its necessity to satisfy
104. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
105. See id. at 301-02 (describing the procedural background and factual similarities
between Quill and Bellas Hess).
106. See id. at 302.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 301.
110. See id. at 302-03.
111. See id. at 305.
112. See id.
113. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967).
114. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-12 (1960) (upholding a use tax not-
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due process concerns was firmly ensconced in the Court's jurispru-
dence."5 As the Quill Court noted however, Due Process Clause juris-
prudence had evolved significantly in the twenty-five years since the
Bellas Hess decision."' It noted further that the focus of due process
analysis had shifted to a more flexible inquiry into whether the seller had
contacts with the taxing state such that it could anticipate being brought
117into court there. This focus, the Court posited, was a departure from
the more traditional emphasis placed on the seller's physical presence in
the taxing state."8 As a result, the Court held that a foreign corporation
could fall within the taxing state's jurisdiction if it took advantage of the
benefits of the forum state, regardless of whether the corporation had
any actual physical presence there.9
The Court determined that a mail-order vendor, by the very nature of
the business involved, has fair warning that its activities may subject it to
the jurisdiction of the taxing state.2° Accordingly, the Court modified
the due process requirements in this area to reflect its holding that a
physical presence was no longer necessary.'21 To the extent that the
Court had based earlier decisions on the necessity of a physical presence,
those decisions were overruled."
That did not end the Quill Court's analysis. Because it had bifurcated
its consideration of Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements, it
was possible for the North Dakota statute to survive due process scrutiny
yet fail under a Commerce Clause analysis.' 3
2. Gotcha! Physical Presence Is Still Required by the Commerce Clause
Highlighting its separate treatment of the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses in its analysis, the Quill Court rejected the argument that if it
found that Quill satisfied the Due Process Clause's minimum contacts
test, it must necessarily find that Quill satisfied the Commerce Clause's
withstanding that all of the seller's in-state solicitation was done by independent contrac-
tors).
115. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 ("[T]he Court suggested that such presence was not
only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, but also necessary.").
116. See id.
117. See id.; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (applying to in rem
proceedings the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" standard found in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
118. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 308.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 305.
[Vol. 48:209
Congress Takes a Byte Out of the Net
substantial nexus requirement. " The Court noted that where a due pro-
cess analysis concerns the notice and fair warning given to a seller that
his activities may subject him to the jurisdiction of the taxing state, a
Commerce Clause analysis has a different emphasis1 2' The Commerce
Clause analysis, the Court explained, concerns the impact of individual
state regulations on the interstate economy as a whole rather than the
rights of the individual. Adopting the bright-line test put forth in Bel-
las Hess-exempting from state-imposed collection and remittance duties
vendors whose sole contact with the taxing state was by mail or common
carrierT12-the Court held that North Dakota's statute violated the Com-
merce Clause and could not stand because Quill lacked a "substantial
nexus" with the state.1 2
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Quill, the precise defi-
nition of sufficient nexus remains unclear.129 Although Complete Auto's
four-part test stands firm, the courts have wavered in establishing a pre-
dictable benchmark of connection sufficient to subject an out-of-state ac-
tor to a state sales or use tax."3 In industries such as the mail-order busi-
ness, where the vendor's contact with the taxing state is remote, Quill's
application is obvious: a vendor whose only contact with the taxing state
is via the mail or common carrier lacks the substantial nexus required by
the Commerce Clause to establish jurisdiction. 131
D. Challenging In Personam or Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Cases
Although the extent of jurisprudence regarding the Internet does not
124. See id. at 312.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967).
128. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8.
129. See Adam L. Schwartz, Note, Nexus or Not? Orvis v. New York, SFA Folio v.
Tracy and the Persistent Confusion over Quill, 29 CONN. L. REV. 485, 485-86 (1996) (dis-
cussing how the Court's failure to provide a precise definition in Quill has encouraged the
states to litigate the nexus issue in an effort to collect revenues).
130. Compare Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 961 (N.Y. 1995) (in-
terpreting Quill's nexus requirements to allow New York to tax a mail-order company
whose salesmen made approximately a dozen visits to the State), with SFA Folio Collec-
tions, Inc. v. Tracy, 652 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ohio 1995) (refusing to allow Ohio to tax a mail-
order company whose parent sold its merchandise and accepted returned goods at retail
outlets in-state); see also Schwartz, supra note 129, at 506-14 (discussing Orvis and SFA
Folio).
131. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311, 317 (refusing to overrule Bellas Hess and finding that a
company whose only contact with the forum state is through the mail lacks sufficient
nexus).
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approach that of the mail-order industry, several cases addressing juris-
dictional problems on the Internet have been decided.132 For example, in
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,"' the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut heard Instruction Set's motion to
dismiss Inset's trademark infringement claim for lack of personal juris-
diction.'9 Despite Instruction Set's lack of physical presence in Con-
necticut, Inset's home state,'35 the court found that it had jurisdiction to
hear the case under Connecticut's long-arm statute.136 That law provided
that a Connecticut resident could sue any foreign corporation on a cause
of action arising out of the repeated solicitation of business within its
borders."' Although Instruction Set's only solicitation in Connecticut
occurred in an advertisement posted on the Internet,"' the court found
that it was sufficiently repetitive to satisfy the long-arm statute. 9
Instruction Set, conceding the long-arm statute's application, further
argued that it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the state to sur-
vive a constitutional challenge on due process grounds.140 The court re-
jected this argument and held that Instruction Set's actions on the Inter-
net, including the establishment of a toll-free number available to
residents of all states, were such that it could reasonably anticipate being
brought into court in Connecticut.
141
132. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997)
(requiring, in a trademark infringement suit, something more than the mere presence of a
Web-page to subject the individual corporation to jurisdiction); CompuServe, Inc. v. Pat-
terson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant purposefully availed
himself of the forum state's benefits and protections when he sent electronic information
over the Internet to in-state residents); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 456, 472 (D. Mass. 1997) (concluding that a company can be subjected to personal
jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that it maintains a Web-site accessible to residents of the
forum state); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn.
1996) (same); see also Christian M. Rieder & Stacy P. Pappas, Personal Jurisdiction for
Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 367, 367 (1998) (dis-
cussing the problems the Internet poses to asserting personal jurisdiction over actors in
commerce).
133. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
134. See id. at 162.
135. See id. at 162-63 (finding that Instruction Set had no employees or offices in Con-
necticut and conducted no business there).
136. See id. at 166.
137. See id. at 164 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2) (repealed 1997)).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 165; cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980) (holding that due process requires minimum contacts such that a defendant could
anticipate "being haled into court" in the forum state).
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Similarly, in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,1 2 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether a vendor, whose
contacts with the state were almost entirely electronic in nature, could be
subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Patterson developed software and
entered into an agreement with CompuServe to make his software avail-
able on its network for a fee.144 The court concluded that Patterson pur-
posefully had availed himself of the benefits and protections of Ohio and,
as such, was subject to in personam jurisdiction.'4 Importantly, the court
found that CompuServe's central location in Ohio acted as a distribution
center for Patterson's software, albeit merely as an electrical conduit;
therefore, he had received a benefit from his contact with the State. 46
Moreover, the court noted that Patterson had benefited from Ohio's
commercial protections when he knowingly entered into a contract with
CompuServe and put his software in the stream of commerce.47
Inset and Patterson make clear that courts will apply traditional notions
of minimum contacts and nexus sufficiency to cases involving the Inter-
net. Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that a ven-
dor who uses the Internet may subject himself unwittingly to a state's
taxing jurisdiction.9
Notwithstanding the courts' ability in Inset and Patterson to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction, it is difficult to reconcile traditional bases of jurisdic-
tion with the taxation of intangible goods and services."0 To address this,
one commentator has called for a paradigmatic shift in establishing a
nexus between the vendor and the taxing state, "situsing" the sale and
142. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
143. See id. at 1262.
144. See id. at 1263.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1265.
148. See id. at 1263 ("As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional in-
quiry is whether.., the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state
that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."') (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D.
Conn. 1996) (applying World-Wide Volkswagen's "reasonable anticipation" test and Inter-
national Shoe's minimum contacts test).
149. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing caselaw treatment of per-
sonal jurisdiction on the Internet).
150. See R. Scot Grierson, State Taxation of the Information Superhighway: A Pro-
posal for Taxation of Information Services, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 603, 664-65 (1996)
(suggesting that the existing case law is of little help in solving the Internet's nexus prob-
lem).
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establishing a nexus in the state in which services are billed. 5' Another
has called for a standard altogether different from one based on physical
presence; this new nexus would be based on the vendor's "economic
presence" or "virtual presence" in the taxing state.'
II. THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT: THE GREAT SOLUTION?
A. Framing the Problem
1. Intangible Property: The Taxation of Information Services
While the traditional notion of nexus is easily applied to situations in
which there is a transfer of tangible property, a nexus analysis is prob-
lematic when considering the taxation of intangible information serv-
ices. ' Generally, intAngible property is not subject to sales tax.' Re-
151. See id. at 631-644. Grierson proposes a model statute that addresses the taxation
of information services. See id. at 633. He suggests an "unbundling" of services into sepa-
rate content-based and transmission-based components. See id. at 632. With this distinc-
tion in mind, services with a high informational component would be subject to tax
whereas "ordinary" telecommunications services would not be taxed. See id. at 636-37.
152. See Forte, supra note 70, at 225-26.
153. See Blum, supra note 7, at 509. States that are hesitant to impose new taxes on
vendors often refrain from making definitive assertions as to the tangibility of a certain
item, and instead defer to the courts or administrative bodies. See Edward A. Morse, State
Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New Under the Sun?, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1113, 1132-33 (1997). This hesitancy to reform taxing structures has led to inconsistency.
For example, mailing lists used by direct-mail vendors have received different tax treat-
ment depending on the format in which they are delivered. Compare Fingerhut Prods. Co.
v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1977) (holding that vendors
who received typed mailing lists were not subject to tax on the transfer of that informa-
tion, but finding that vendors who received those same lists on gummed labels or com-
puter tapes were liable for the state's use tax), with Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 440 A.2d 104, 118 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1981) (holding that mailing lists sold on mag-
netic tape were not taxable because the true object of the transaction was the names on
the list, and not the magnetic tape itself). The court in Fingerhut reasoned that the tapes
and labels were a tangible representation of the lists, whereas the typed lists were used for
the information contained therein. See Fingerhut, 258 N.W.2d at 610. Notwithstanding
the decision of the New Jersey Tax Court in Spencer Gifts, the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court held that mailing labels provided by a direct mailer were tax-
able. See Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 471 A.2d 786, 787 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983). These cases demonstrate that the distinction between tangible
and intangible goods is controversial and carries substantial tax ramifications with its char-
acterization.
154. See Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation of Intangibles Generates In-
creasing Controversy, 80 J. TAX'N 296, 300 (1994). Despite this fact, approximately one-
half of the states currently apply a sales tax to information services. See Grierson, supra
note 150, at 620. Some currently available, or soon to be available, services on the Inter-
net include videos, cable television, recorded music, books, newspapers, magazines, infor-
mation databases, education, banking and brokerage services, electronic bill payment,
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cently, however, courts have come to view packaged software as tangible
personal property subject to tax, rather than intangible property trans-
ferred via an incidental, tangible medium. 5 Present technology has
made it possible to convert otherwise tangible property to digital, intan-
156gible information. In this electronic form, information can be trans-
ferred via a host of media, including direct broadcast satellite, integrated
services digital network ("ISDN"), or the Internet. As a result, com-
bulletin boards and chat rooms, electronic mail, and software that can be downloaded. See
Morse, supra note 153, at 1128-29. These services are in addition to the access provided by
Internet Service Providers such as America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe. See id. at
1127 n.97.
Computer software is yet another product that has received differing tax treatment
based in part on its tangibility. In an early case treating software as intangible property,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that software
transmitted on punched cards was nontaxable intangible property because the transaction
was based on the information punched onto the cards, and not the cards themselves. See
District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 465 F.2d 615, 617 (D.C. Cir.
1972); see also Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976)
(holding that information placed on punched cards is the product being purchased and,
therefore, is to be regarded as intangible property not subject to tax).
155. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Barthelemy, 643 So. 2d 1240, 1245 (La. 1984); see
also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 464 A.2d 248, 261 (Md. 1983)
(analogizing software packaged on a disk to music sold on a record to find the former tax-
able); Hasbro Indus., Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124, 126-27 (R.I. 1985) (holding that the
service content of a prepackaged program was only part of the transaction and could be
included in the sale price as part of the tangible property for tax purposes); Citizens and S.
Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 311 S.E.2d 717, 719 (S.C. 1984) (holding that the
program was transferred in a form that could be "seen, weighed, measured, felt, and
touched was therefore tangible personal property" and subject to tax).
156. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 616-17. The case for applying a sales tax to serv-
ices typically has included the following arguments: first, as the national economy contin-
ues to grow most in the service sector, such a tax would expand the state's tax base. See
Morse, supra note 153, at 1131 (noting as an illustration a 15% percent decline-from 67%
percent to 52% percent-in the gross domestic product derived from the sale of goods).
The Internet's potential to deliver services would appear to further this shift. See Grier-
son, supra note 150, at 616 (stating that the "revenue-producing potential of an expanding
information services industry is one of the primary reasons for supporting the [sales] tax
[on services]").
Second, to buttress the argument that it is fallacious to tax the consumption of goods
and not the consumption of services, some commentators point to a specific notion that
the "sales tax is rooted in consumption." See Morse, supra note 153, at 1131. Obviously,
taxing goods and not services presents a "'highly arbitrary' bias, in which consumers of
services are favored over consumers of goods by giving service consumers a lower tax bur-
den in satisfying their needs and wants. See id. (quoting JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN &
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, II STATE TAXATION 12.05, at 12-17 (2d ed. 1992)). This dis-
crimination is illogical, scholars argue, because "services are 'an integral part of any good'
... and, in the case of consumers, 'both [goods and services] satisfy personal wants."' Id.
157. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 609-12. ISDN technology permits a user to send
and receive data while maintaining a conversation on the telephone. See id. at 612. All
transmissions are digitized and are transferred over a normal telephone line. See id. As its
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panies that have the technology to transfer data through these media
will, absent legislative or administrative action, be able to avoid the
158
nexus that taxing states can use to tax revenue.
Professors Due and Mikesell argue that taxing all tangible property
while not taxing all intangible services is regressive, burdening lower in-
come families disproportionately because of their spending patterns." 9
The regressivity lies in the notion that individuals and families bear the
burden of a consumption-based tax because each group spends a large
proportion of its income on consumable, tangible property, and not in-
tangible services.'6 At the same time, people in higher income brackets
spend proportionately more money on intangible services, thereby
avoiding the sales tax.
price drops, the use of such technology is becoming more widespread. See id.
Future technology also will enable a user to send and receive information by direct sat-
ellite. See id. The implication of such technology is that it will allow on-line merchants to
avoid land-based telecommunications equipment entirely, thereby avoiding the physical
presence requirement to create a nexus under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 612-13.
158. See id. at 617. But see Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d
13, 18 (S.C. 1993) (finding jursidiction where a foreign corporation derived income from
the use of intangible property in the taxing state, despite the total absence of a physical
presence within the state).
In Geoffrey, Toys R Us had granted Geoffrey, Inc., one of its wholly owned subsidiaries
and ownership of several trademarks and trade names. See id. at 15. Geoffrey entered
into a licensing agreement in which it allowed its parent, Toys R Us, to use the "Toys R
Us" trade name in South Carolina and forty-four other states. See id. Toys R Us paid
royalties to Geoffrey for the use of its trademarks in South Carolina. See id. The State
charged Geoffrey with a responsibility to pay South Carolina income tax on the royalties
received from Toys R Us. See id.
159. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 91 (2d ed. 1994); see also HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 156, 12.05, 12-16 (arguing that a tax on goods but not on
services is unjustified and runs counter to economic theory).
160. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 159, at 91; Grierson, supra note 150, at 619.
161. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 159, at 91; Grierson, supra note 150, at 619.
Although Due and Mikesell argue that including services in the tax base makes the sales
tax less regressive, they note that this result may well depend on the scope of services be-
ing taxed. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 159, at 91 (suggesting that failure to tax all
services would not eliminate the regressivity, or even ameliorate it effectively). For in-
stance, a recent survey suggests that Internet users tend to be individuals in higher income
brackets; the survey "found that the average household income of on-line users was
$48,200 ... [rather than] the general population's $44,400 average." Thomas E. Weber,
Who Uses the Internet?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R6 (citing a Cybercitizen survey by
Yankelovich Partners). This figure, however, was significantly lower than the average in-
come for on-line users a year earlier: $58,100. See id. Combined with the increasing avail-
ability of personal computers and Internet access at low prices, the decline in on-line us-
ers' average incomes suggests the regressivity problem may abate somewhat as lower
income families gain access to intangible services. See Morse, supra note 153, at 1131-32.
As Professor Morse suggests, however, a degree of regressivity likely will continue; a dif-
ference in demographics between Internet users and Internet purchasers indicates a lack
[Vol. 48:209
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As an alternative to the current paradigm, Professors Due and Mike-
sell suggest the possibility of a comprehensive sales tax on services.
Such a tax would reduce the regressivity of the current system and pro-
vide the states with much sought-after revenue.'63 In addition, it would
eliminate the perceived discrimination in the treatment between sales of
services and sales of goodsM Lastly, the tax would ameliorate existing
complications associated with transactions involving both services and
consumables, where the tangible property portions of the transaction
currently are subject to tax and the intangible service portions are ex-
empt.
165
Although not approaching such a comprehensive tax, and despite ar-
guments advanced by those such as Due and Mikesell, several states cur-
rently tax information services to varying degrees.166 For example, Cali-
• 16 1
fornia taxes information services only in very limited circumstances.
Indeed, its implementing regulation does not even mention information
services; however, the State levies a tax whenever information is con-
verted into a tangible form, such as a computer tape or diskette.'9 Cali-
fornia courts attempt to discern whether the "true object" of the transac-
tion is to transfer tangible property, which is taxable, or to perform an
intangible service, which is non-taxable. 69
of correlation between the number of people using the Internet as a tool of commerce and
the number using it solely for information. See id. at 1132.
Finally, taxing services at the same level as goods would eliminate the need to distin-
guish between the two. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 159, at 91. As Professor Morse
points out, services are involved in the production or sale of nearly any product; at the
same time, products sold (such as a mailing list) frequently include a service component.
See Morse, supra note 153, at 1132.
162. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 159, at 90-92.
163. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 618; supra note 161 (discussing the regressivity
argument).
164. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 618; supra note 161 (discussing the regressivity
argument).
165. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 618. The distinction between services and con-
sumable property has been handled by the courts using a "true object test." See id. at 619.
This test involves making inquiries into the minds of both seller and purchaser to discern
whether they intended to conduct a transaction for a service or a commodity. See id.
166. See id. at 620; infra notes 167-171 and accompanying text (discussing California
and Ohio's treatment of a tax on information services).
167. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 621.
168. See id. at 621-22. In California, a taxable event occurs when a vendor charges a
customer for "producing, fabricating, processing, printing, imprinting or otherwise physi-
cally altering, modifying or treating consumer-furnished tangible personal property." Id.
(citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 1502 (c)(2) (1995)).
169. See id. at 622. A sample application of the true object test is the production of a
mailing list. See id. While there is no doubt that there is a service component in the pro-
duction of the list, the primary object of the transaction is the list itself and it is this list
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
Ohio is one of a few states that includes "electronic information serv-
ices" as a vehicle by which taxable sales can be consummated,17° defining
"[e]lectronic information services" to include services that "provid[e] ac-
cess to computer equipment by means of telecommunications equip-
ment. 17  States, such as California and Ohio, that attempt to tax out-of-
state providers of information services must comport with the Due Proc-
ess and Commerce Clause requirements established in the Quill line of
cases. 17 The question for the states therefore, is how to satisfy those testsin the electronic realm.
2. Agency/Representational Nexus Theory
In Quill, the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of splitting
Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis into two distinct questions. 7 1
In so doing, the Court held that physical presence was no longer neces-
sary to satisfy due process concerns, but remained a requirement under
the Commerce Clause.'74 In the wake of Quill, courts are left with the
task of establishing jurisdiction to tax vendors whose only contact with
the taxing state is the Internet.' 7
One method of obtaining jurisdiction is to find an agent or representa-
tive of the out-of-state vendor within the taxing state who makes the out-
of-state vendor's sales possible. 76 In the context of Internet sales, the
most obvious conduit to the out-of-state vendor would seem to be his
Internet Service Provider ("ISP"). 177 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit in Patter-
son found that an agency relationship may exist between a private ven-
dor and an ISP.'78 This conclusion seems flawed however, because the
that is taxable as tangible personal property. See id.
170. See id. at 622-23. The other jurisdictions that have statutes specifically mention-
ing "information services" are the District of Columbia and Texas. See id. at 622 n.88.
171. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(Y)(1)(c) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997).
172. See generally Grierson, supra note 150, at 644-48 (analyzing the taxation of infor-
mation services in light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the Commerce Clause
and Due Process Clause arenas, particularly the Quill line of cases).
173. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
174. See id. at 311, 313.
175. See Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 616 (1997).
176. See id. at 620.
177. See id. at 622. Electronic "storefronts" may be placed directly on the Internet or
may be contracted through a commercial ISP such as CompuServe or America Online.
See id. at 607. These ISPs then contract with local telecommunications companies to carry
their signal; supporters of this theory argue that this contract establishes the necessary
contact between the ISP and the taxing state. See id. at 622.
178. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-66 (6th Cir. 1996). The
Sixth Circuit concluded that
[Vol. 48:209
Congress Takes a Byte Out of the Net
relationship between an ISP and a vendor is no different from the rela-
tionship between a mail-order vendor and the United States Postal
Service." 9 Far from an agency relationship, the ISP acts merely as a
common carrier who enters into agreements with vendors to carry their
advertisements. 180
A second avenue for finding an agency relationship may be through
the telecommunications provider."' It is clear that an out-of-state Inter-
net vendor's purpose would be frustrated without a telecommunications
infrastructure through which to transmit his advertisement.8 2 Unfortu-
nately, the same argument that defeats the attempt to find an agency re-
lationship between an ISP and a vendor also applies in this context; the
telecommunications provider is merely a common carrier."' Telecom-
munications providers, like ISPs, do nothing more than make it possible
for an electrical impulse to travel along their wires.1 4 An in-state tele-
communications provider does nothing to actively solicit business for the
vendor within the state; by acting as a conduit, it is merely pursuing its
own business, almost in the role of an independent contractor, rather
than acting as an agent of the out-of-state vendor.
1 5
As a third possibility, courts may look to the relationship between the
vendor and the consumer's in-state credit card system to establish juris-
Patterson ha[d] knowingly made an effort-and, in fact, purposefully con-
tracted-to market a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe op-
erating, in effect, as his distribution center. Thus, it [was] reasonable to subject
Patterson to suit in Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network serv-
ice he chose to employ.
Id. It should be noted that the case did not include a tax problem, but centered around an
Ohio court's ability to assert in personam jurisdiction over Patterson. See id. at 1259-60.
179. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 622-23.
180. See id.
181. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 651.
182. See id. at 652. Note, however, that when a vendor uses a direct broadcast satel-
lite, the product is beamed directly into the consumer's home (via his own satellite dish)
and does not come into contact with any telecommunications infrastructure. See id. at 655.
Thus, the physical presence does not seem to exist in that instance and the theory loses
some of its validity. See id.
183. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 625 (classifying on-line service providers as com-
mon carriers).
184. See Grierson, supra note 150, at 652 (stating that the telecommunications pro-
vider acts as the in-state distributor of the out-of-state vendor).
185. See id.; see also Arthur Rosen & Alysse Grossman, Coping With Electronic
Commerce Today, 14 STATE TAX NOTES 463, 470 (1998). In the context of finding an
agency relationship between the ISP and the vendor, or the telecommunications provider
and the vendor, it also should be noted that 1) the vendor does not exercise any control
over the service provider; 2) the service provider neither holds itself out to be an agent of
the vendor, nor can it bind the vendor in contract; and 3) there is no fiduciary relationship
between the service provider and the vendor. See id.
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diction."' This argument is flawed, however, and is susceptible to the
same arguments that prevent telecommunications and ISP providers
from serving as agents, because in-state credit card systems neither solicit
customer sales, nor provide customer services; "8 and courts have heldthat both are indicative of an agency relationship.'9
3. Changing the Nexus Standard
As an alternative to the agency theory, some have argued for a change
in the definition of physical presence.' 89 One suggestion is that the physi-
cal presence requirement be replaced by an "economic presence" re-
quirement.' 9° Under that standard, a vendor who sells wares on the
Internet has an intermediate "informational presence" when a consumer
first accesses the vendor's Web-page; but this presence would not satisfy
the Commerce Clause's nexus requirement. 9' Once the first consumer
purchases the vendor's product through the Internet however, the safe
harbor of informational presence would be replaced with an economic
presence that would survive constitutional scrutiny; at that point, the
vendor is deemed to have voluntarily entered the state's taxing jurisdic-
tion in an attempt to do business. 92 The purchase by an in-state resident
connects the out-of-state vendor to the taxing state.
A second alternative argues for the creation of a "virtual" presence.'9
Under this analysis, a vendor lacking a purely tangible, physical presence
would have a virtual presence in any jurisdiction where a consumer had
access to its Web-site. '94 If this argument was accepted, however, any
vendor doing business on the Internet would have a virtual presence in
any state where a computer with Internet capability existed.'9 The obvi-
ous parallel to the mail-order industry would be the creation of a pres-
ence in any state where a catalog came to rest on a coffee table; a sce-
186. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 626.
187. See id.
188. Cf., e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 249-50 (1987) (analyzing in-state customer service as sufficient to satisfy nexus re-
quirements).
189. See Mitch Betts, Internet Renews Tax Battles: Murky On-Line Tax Jurisdictions
Cause Trouble, COMPUTERWORLD, June 19, 1995, at 64 (describing criticisms of the Su-
preme Court's continued adherence to the physical presence requirement in an age of
commerce that occurs via "mail, fax, and modem").
190. See Forte, supra note 70, at 225.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 628.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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nario already ruled unconstitutional in both Bellas Hess and Quill, where
the Court held that the Commerce Clause required more than such an
innocuous presence. 196
B. Hold Up! Wait a Minute! The Congressional Response
If, as it appears, courts will continue to allow states like California and
Ohio to tax Internet transactions, some have suggested that the Federal
Government should intercede, not only to ameliorate the vendor's newly
created administrative burden, but also to grant express state authority in
this area.1 Congress has explicit authority to regulate interstate com-
merce under Article I of the Constitution, and because it is impractical to
legislate changes to the notion of due process, any congressional move-
ment to overcome the constitutional hurdles to states taxing out-of-state
vendors most likely will be through an exercise of its Commerce Clause
198power.
Congress could, therefore, authorize states to impose tax collection re-
sponsibilities on out-of-state vendors.199 Congress has attempted to take
such action in the past with respect to mail-order vendors, but with little200
success. In the 105th Congress, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Rep-
196. See id.; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (refusing to
overrule Bellas Hess's bright-line rule); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) ("declin[ing] to obliterate" the distinction between those
mail-order sellers who hold property in the state, and those whose only contact with the
taxing state is through the mail).
197. See Forte, supra note 70, at 214-16.
198. See id. at 215.
199. See id.
200. See id.; see also, e.g., H.R. 2230, 101st Cong. (1989) (granting states the power to
require collection of sales taxes by out-of-state vendors if the vendor engages in regular or
systematic solicitation of business in the state and has annual sales exceeding either $12.5
million in the United States or $500,000 in the taxing state).
Congress has enacted legislation determining, albeit in very limited circumstances, when
states can impose a tax on a nonresident corporate entity. See 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994)
(originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 86-272, §101(a)(1), 73 Stat. 555 (1959). In fact, under
the legislation, states are prohibited only from imposing an income tax on an entity that
solicits orders for tangible goods to be approved and shipped from outside the taxing state.
See id. Importantly, it should be noted that Public Law 86-272 does not protect a corpora-
tion from state imposition of a sales or use tax; a state can tax a vendor so long as it can
assert jurisdiction without offending Due Process Clause or Commerce Clause protec-
tions. See Rosen & Grossman, supra note 185, at 467. Congress's general failure to pass
adequate legislation has been attributed to the power of the mail-order lobby. See Pamela
M. Krill, Note, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota: Tax Nexus Under the Due Process and Com-
merce Clauses No Longer the Same, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1429 & n.152 (1993) (dis-
cussing the national campaign to prevent federal legislation waged by the Direct Market-
ing Association, the industry's largest trade association). The absence of such an element
in the nascent group of Internet vendors could make passage of Internet-specific legisla-
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resentative Christopher Cox (R-CA) introduced companion bills, the
Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA"), addressing state taxation ofInte ne  .. 201
Internet transactions. The primary purpose of the legislation is to pro-
vide for a period of careful study in an atmosphere free from distracting
legislative movement by the states.2
As enacted, House Bill 4328 (formerly House Bill 4105) imposes a
three-year moratorium, retroactive to October 1, 1998, that prevents
states and localities from assessing or collecting taxes on "Internet ac-
cess." 20 3 Importantly, the bill does not prohibit states from taxing the sale
of goods so long as those taxes are applied similarly to mail-order and re-
tail transactions. °4 In addition, states that have enacted taxes on Internet
access prior to October 1, 1998 will be exempt from the moratorium if
the tax was authorized by statute and either (1) an Internet access pro-
vider had reason to know that the existing tax statute was interpreted so
as to include Internet access; or (2) the state or locality "generally col-
lected such tax on charges for Internet access., 205
Section 1102 of House Bill 4328 establishes an entity known as the Ad-
visory Commission on Electronic Commerce ("Commission"). 24 The
Commission is designed to bring together a mix of federal, state, and lo-
cal government officials, as well as representatives from taxpayer and
business groups, to devise a framework for taxing Internet commerce. 7
tion easier. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 619.
201. See S. 442, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1054, 105th Cong. (1997). H.R. 4105 passed
the House of Representatives by voice vote on June 23, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. H5037
(daily ed. June 23, 1998). The Senate passed its version of the ITFA, Senate Bill 442 by a
96-2 vote on October 8, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S11858 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998). Presi-
dent Clinton signed the ITFA into law on October 21, 1998. See supra note 21.
202. See 143 CONG. REC. S2282-83 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Wy-
den). As Senator Wyden stated: "The purpose of the bill I am introducing today.., is to
allow everyone to step back and take a deep breath. It says let's suspend this crazy tax
quilting bee so that everyone can come together in a rational way to figure out what policy
makes the most sense." Id. at S2283.
203. Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. § 1101(a) (1998). "Internet
access" is defined in the bill as a "service that enables users to access content, information,
electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet .... " Id. § 1101(e)(3)(D). In
addition, the bill expressly prohibits states from imposing taxes that discriminate based on
the mode of transfer used; that is, electronic commerce versus a more traditional means of
commerce. See id. §§ 1101(a)(2); 1104(2) (defining "discriminatory tax").
204. See supra note 203 (describing the bill's moratorium as extending only to those
taxes that are applied unequally to business conducted over the Internet versus more tra-
ditional means).
205. H.R. 4328, §§ 1101(b), (d)(1)-(2). Unlike the House passed version, see H.R.
4105, 105th Cong, § 151(b)(1) (1998), House Bill 4328 extends the grandfather clause to
local taxing authorities. See H.R. 4328, § 1101(b).
206. See H.R. 4328, § 1102(a).
207. See id. § 1102(b) (listing membership guidelines for Commission).
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As currently written, the bill imparts fairly specific goals and guidelines
under which the Commission is to operate.208 In addition, according to
the provisions of House Bill 4328, the work of the Commission is to cul-
minate in a series of legislative recommendations to Congress2 O The
stated duties of the Commission are, inter alia, to examine model legisla-
tion that would propose a uniform definition of electronic commerce and
to simplify interstate administration of sales and use taxes.2 '0 The Com-
mission also is directed to move toward defining and proposing a new
211
nexus standard for electronic commerce.
Except for these vague recommendations, the ITFA as enacted does
not contain many valuable provisions that were part of the bill as it
passed the House as House Bill 4105." For example, House Bill 4105
directed the Commission to propose legislation establishing a method of
interstate dispute resolution regarding multiple taxation and make per-
manent the ITFA's moratorium on the taxation of Internet access serv-
ices." In addition, it directed the Commission to craft legislation pro-
viding that any state not adopting a single sales and use tax rate, and not
putting into place simplified procedures within four years after the
ITFA's enactment, would be deemed to have an effective sales and use
214tax rate of zero percent. Finally, House Bill 4105 required an expe-
dited review of Commission recommendations by the President and
Congress.1 5
208. See id. § 1102(g). The bill directs the Commission to work in conjunction with the
National Tax Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project. See
id. § 1102(h) (declaring that in no way should the work of the Commission interfere with
the work of the Tax Project); see also infra notes 219, 235, 248, 250 (describing in detail the
work of the Tax Project).
209. See H.R. 4328 § 1103. These proposals are to be made within eighteen months
after the ITFA is enacted. See id.
210. See id. § 1102(g)(2)(D)(i), (g)(2)(F).
211. Cf. id. § 1102(g)(2)(E). House Bill 4105, the ITFA passed by the House, con-
tained language that was more specific to the issue of nexus; such language was not in-
cluded in the final version of the bill. See H.R. 4105, 105th Cong. §§ 152(g)(10), 153(b)(1)
(1998).
212. Among the legislative recommendations by the Commission directed by House
Bill 4105 was a proposal that conditioned the future ability of states to impose sales and
use taxes on electronic commerce on the adoption of a statewide single tax rate, and sim-
ple administrative procedures. See H.R. 4105. § 153(b)(2).
213. See id. § 153(b)(5)-(6).
214. See id. § 153(b)(3).
215. See id. §§ 153(c), 154(a). These provisions mandated that the President forward
to Congress, within forty-five days of receipt, those Commission recommendations he
found "necessary or expedient." Id. § 153(c). In addition, those congressional committees
with jurisdiction must consider those forwarded recommendations within ninety days of
receipt. See id. § 154(a). None of these provisions are in the ITFA as enacted.
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C. Executive Response: Neutrality Theory
As Congress places a moratorium on new state Internet taxes, the
Treasury Department also has announced a policy of neutrality toward
Internet commerce.216 Under this policy, no new taxes on Internet com-
merce would be imposed; instead, the income earned through electronic
means would be taxed in the same manner as that derived from more
conventional means.217 After the release of its report in November 1996,
however, officials from the Treasury Department joined forces with the
Tax Project-an initiative of industry and government leaders designedS218
to forge a compromise and "operating under the auspices of the Na-
tional Tax Association (NTA)"-to "develop[] a national approach ...
to questions regarding state taxation of electronic commerce.
219
216. See Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy Impli-
cations of Global Electronic Commerce at iii (visited Nov. 3, 1998) <ftp://ftp.fedworld.gov
/pub/tel/internet.txt>. The reported purpose of this report was to provide an introduction
to federal tax policy and administration issues presented by the growth in Internet com-
merce, and to foment discussion. See id. at i.
217. See id. at iii.
218. See Amy Hamilton, Internet Tax Talks Come Home to Treasury, 13 STATE TAX
NOTES 1406, 1406 (1997) (stating that the Treasury Department was the first federal
member to join the NTA in its efforts). The Federal Government became involved with
the Tax Project in the summer of 1997 after Ira Magaziner, President Clinton's senior
policy adviser, concluded that the United States would lead the global economy in its ap-
proach to the subject of electronic commerce. See id.
219. Id. Bruce Cohen, an attorney with the Treasury Department, recently partici-
pated in discussions with the Tax Project concerning preliminary proposals to address
taxation of electronic commerce. See id. Cohen suggested that initiatives such as the Tax
Project demonstrate precisely the national dialogue the Department called for in its 1996
report. See id.
As an arm of the Federal Government, the Treasury Department cannot concern itself
merely with subnational taxation of electronic commerce; the global nature of electronic
commerce commands the Treasury Department's attention both at home and abroad. See
id. at 1407 (relating the statement of Bruce Cohen, the Treasury Department's representa-
tive to the Tax Project, that "the international tax issues are not going to be resolved [eas-
ily]"). European ministers, industry leaders, and consumers recently met in Bonn, Ger-
many to begin development of solutions to existing problems of electronic commerce. See
id. Although members of the European Community have not commented directly on
what is perhaps the most controversial idea put forth in Treasury's 1996 report-a move
away from source-based taxation toward a residence-based system-Australia has not
been similarly silent. See id.
Australia's status as a net importer of capital distinguishes it from other, more export-
oriented nations in the discussion of global taxation of Internet commerce. See id. An
Australian international tax policy statement expressed concern regarding the United
States position to move to a residence-based regime. See id. The Australian report con-
cluded that
'[S]ource and residency principles are equally at risk' because they often turn on
matters of form that 'mAy prove difficult to establish or test or may be readily
manipulated in an electronic commerce environment where business activity is
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III. THE FUTURE OF INTERNET TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO
BRING STATE TAXATION INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
Under the ITFA, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of
recommending legislative proposals to Congress.2 0 Although the ITFA
as enacted lacks the specific House language that would have required
that the Commission address issues of nexus and the possibility of a
streamlined, uniform sales and use tax structure,22' it is useful to examine
those issues and possible solutions in some detail.
A. Adoption of a New Standard for Internet Taxation
Under the Supreme Court's bifurcated analysis in Quill, a state tax
must satisfy separate Commerce Clause and due process requirements.2
With the emergence of Internet technology however, the nexus issue
poses a difficult problem for state policy makers.22 ' Although at least one
commentator advocates dissolution of the Bellas Hess physical presence
requirement,2 24 the physical presence requirement set forth in Bellas Hess
and affirmed, so far as the Commerce Clause is concerned, in Quill,221
highly flexible.' ... [N]either source nor residence alone is satisfactory as a basis
of income tax liability for Internet transactions.
Id.
220. See H.R. 4328,105th Cong. § 1103 (1998).
221. See H.R. 4105, 105th Cong. §§ 153(b)(1)-(2), (b)(4) (1998).
222. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992). In adopting a bifur-
cated analysis the Court noted
'Due Process' and '[Clommerce [C]lause' conceptions are not always sharply
separable in dealing with these problems .... To some extent they overlap. If
there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the
tax imposes on the commerce among the states becomes 'undue.' But, though
overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be more than suf-
ficient factual connections, with economic and legal effects, between the transac-
tion and the taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet
it may fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce. And, although
the two notions cannot always be separated, clarity of consideration and of deci-
sion would be promoted if the two issues are approached, where they are pre-
sented, at least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled
ones ....
Id. at 305-06 (internal citations omitted).
223. See Forte, supra note 70, at 226 (concluding that the "physical presence require-
ment is outdated and inequitable" and must "be updated to reflect the realities of modern
commerce").
224. See Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales,
39 VAND. L. REv. 993, 1008 (1986). Hartman characterizes the Court's decision in Bellas
Hess as a "roadblock to use tax collection[]" and argues that the "Court "could-and
should-relegate the Bellas Hess decision to the dustbin of unconstitutional oblivion." Id.
225. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that
although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of
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remains a constitutional requirement for state taxation of out-of-state
vendors.26 To satisfy the nexus requirement, as modified by the Court in
Quill, the out-of-state vendor must purposefully direct activities at in-
state residents and there must be some rational connection between the
vendor's activity and the benefit provided by the taxing state."7
The question then, is what the nature of that nexus should be. The
"economic presence" theory provides the best characterization of the
current substantial nexus standard. 8 Under a due process analysis, the
"economic presence" standard follows much of the Quill Court's rea-
soning; a vendor would be required to collect taxes if his activities were
purposefully directed toward the state's market and were such that he
could reasonably anticipate being taxed there.22 9 The economic presence
standard also takes into consideration that, although a business may not
have a physical presence in the taxing state, it nonetheless may benefit
from state services that provide its consumers with social and economic
stability-in essence, state preservation of the vendor's market.230
With respect to Commerce Clause analysis, a modified "economic
presence" standard keeps pace with emerging cyber-commerce.21 The
Quill Court made clear that the Commerce Clause requires more than a
"sufficient connection" between the vendor and the taxing state; it re-
quires the vendor to have some physical presence within the taxing state
232before that state may subject it to jurisdiction. Due to the nature of the
Internet industry, however, it is impractical to require a physical pres-
23
ence in the taxing state to satisfy Commerce Clause restrictions. Al-
taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement,
our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that
Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes. To the contrary, the
continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles
of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law.
Id. at 317.
226. See id. at 317-19.
227. See Edson, supra note 12, at 922.
228. See id. at 947 (arguing that the nature of the changing electronic marketplace de-
mands a standard based less on the physical presence within the taxing state and more on
the nature of the vendor's activities in that state).
229. See id. at 940.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 947.
232. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (adopting the bright-
line physical presence requirement put forth in Bellas Hess); see also Edson, supra note 12,
at 942.
233. See Ashraf, supra note 175, at 628 (stating that the Supreme Court that decided
both Bellas Hess and Quill probably did not foresee the possibility, or, if it did, the scope
of future on-line sales). Ashraf suggests that one apparently simple solution would be to
impose a "virtual presence" standard in which a vendor would have a physical presence in
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though the Quill Court suggested that a "substantial nexus" was the ap-
propriate constitutional standard, it again failed to elucidate what would
constitute such a nexus, beyond physical presence.2 "4 A "substantial eco-
nomic presence" standard would require an examination of the fre-
quency, quality, and systematic nature of the vendor's contact with the
taxing state and, in so doing, would ensure that only those vendors whose
contact with the forum state approached that of a traditional out-of-state
235
retailer would be subject to tax.
B. Proposals for Substantive Federal Action
If states are able to impose the duty to collect taxes on Internet yen-
any state in which a consumer accessed the site. See id. Ashraf points out the problem
inherent in such a solution, however, is that "[b]y changing and expanding the definition of
physical presence, and in effect equating nonphysical presence in a state with physical
presence, the state legislative bodies would be writing the constitutional requirement of
physical presence out of existence." Id.
234. See Edson, supra note 12, at 942.
235. See id. at 943-46 (describing the requirements of a would-be "substantial eco-
nomic presence" standard). The Tax Project recently reported its "tentative and prelimi-
nary thinking on the direction that a statute addressed to taxation of electronic commerce
might take." NTA Report, supra note 2, at 1255. Perhaps the greatest departure the Tax
Project takes from the established physical presence paradigm is in establishing nexus. See
id. at 1258. Under the proposal, nexus is established in the state of the consumer's billing
address. See id. The vendor must make a good faith effort to determine the correct billing
address and, if it can be determined, to collect and remit a sales or use tax to that state.
See id. at 1259. As long as the vendor makes a good faith attempt at determining the
proper billing address, he could not be held liable if the consumer was deliberately falsi-
fying information. See id. The Tax Project asserts that such a novel approach is necessary
because many Internet vendors may not know the location of the person to whom they are
selling goods or services. See id. at 1258. The Tax Project realizes that Congress might
have to remove any existing impediment the Dormant Commerce Clause presents to the
approach, and also notes that the Due Process Clause may ultimately bar such a standard.
See id.
The most controversial aspect of the nexus standard supported by the Tax Project oc-
curs in the event the vendor cannot accurately determine the consumer's proper billing
address. See id. at 1259-60. One alternative, termed the "Throwback Rule," obligates the
vendor to assess the appropriate sales tax and remit it to his own state. See id. at 1259. In
another alternative, termed the "Throwaround Rule," the vendor would not send sales
taxes back to the state in which his principal place of business is located, but rather, would
"assign[] it to all of the states in which the vendor makes taxable sales of electronically
transmitted information or services, in the same proportion as the taxpayer's sales receipts
from electronic commerce were distributed among the states during the preceding calen-
dar year." Id. at 1260. The Tax Project acknowledges the novelty of the "Throwaround
Rule," which could be criticized on the ground that it assumes that all sales are taxed,
rather than taxable, but argues that it results in a more equitable distribution of revenue
than the throwback rule, which only sends the revenue to one state. See id. The proposal
also calls for enhanced enforcement of existing use tax laws by the creation of a clearing-
house to which vendors who make sales to states in which they do not have a physical
presence would be required to report sales. See id. at 1261.
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dors, particularly use taxes, the administrative burden placed on those
vendors would be considerable. 36 The vendor would have to comply
with the differing tax codes in each state where it conducts business.237
After determining whether it is subject to the responsibility, the vendor
would have to administer, collect, and then remit the appropriate amount
of tax to the state. 38
The Quill Court considered the role of Congress in fashioning an an-
swer to the questions left by Bellas Hess's bright-line test.2 39 In deciding
that it was not proper to overrule Bellas Hess, the Court found that the
"ultimate power to resolve" the dispute over due process concerns laid
with the Congress. 4° Calling upon its power to regulate interstate com-
merce granted by the Constitution, Congress can fashion a solution if it
so chooses.241 The moratorium recently enacted may not be the right an-
swer; by grandfathering those states that already have Internet taxes on
their books, the moratorium discriminates against states without such
laws by preventing them from realizing the potential revenue from Inter-
net taxes. 24 Enacting a moratorium provides Congress with an opportu-
nity and a vehicle by which to declare its desire to address the problem
and to satisfy its concomitant need for time to figure out the best way to
do so.243 By definition, the moratorium will not in and of itself provide an
236. See Blum, supra note 7, at 496 (describing the adverse effects on a company that
had to comply with tax laws in a state where it did not have a physical presence).
237. See id. at 495-96 & n.8; see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6 (noting that there are
over 6,000 state and local taxing jurisdictions).
238. See Blum, supra note 7, at 496.
239. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
240. See id. The Court noted that Congress had considered, but not enacted, legisla-
tion to overrule Bellas Hess. See id. Positing that Congress's failure to act on this legisla-
tion was perhaps based on its respect for the Court's holding in Bellas Hess-that states
were prohibited from imposing such taxes-the Court definitively removed that notion
from Congress's consideration. See id. In the words of Justice Stevens, writing for the
court, "today we have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to de-
cide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order con-
cerns with a duty to collect use taxes." Id. In fact, Justice Stevens wrote, even if the Court
had decided that Bellas Hess was inconsistent with Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it
might not overrule it, but instead, would allow Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
power. See id.
241. See id. at 318-19. Justice Stevens noted that.Congress has the power to protect
interstate commerce from undue burden. See id. Rather than legislate judicially in this
situation, Stevens supposed it would be "the better part of both wisdom and valor.., to
respect the judgment" of Congress and the Executive branch. See id. at 319.
242. Cf. Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. § 1101(b) (1998).
243. See 143 CONG. REC. S2283 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
(describing the moratorium and requiring submission of policy recommendations to Con-
gress).
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answer; it merely will buy Congress time.2"
Legislation introduced in years past to address the nexus problem in
the mail-order industry failed in part because of a powerful, industry
sponsored lobby.4 5 Conditions now may be favorable for the enactment
of similar language with respect to Internet commerce before a powerful
lobby can organize itself and quash congressional effort.246 Certainly
Congress is faced with a policy decision: to remain on the sidelines and
allow the states to work the matter out;247 through the ITFA, to initiate a
244. See id. Industry and state officials have been quick to fault the ITFA for under-
mining a state tax base in an era of scarce state revenue resources. See Doug Sheppard,
Proposed Internet Act a Natural for Debate at Electronic Commerce Seminar, 14 STATE
TAX NOTES 455, 455 (1998). A conference held recently by the National Tax Association
concluded with a debate over the Act's ramifications. See id. In one session, three out of
four presenters spoke out against the Act, alleging that Congress would be prohibiting the
states from taxing Internet commerce indefinitely. See id. Retailers argue that allowing
states to tax them while exempting Internet vendors is harmful to their business; state and
local governments, meanwhile, argue that Congress is taking away a necessary power in
this era of shrinking tax bases. See id.; see also Tannenwald, supra note 17, at 357 (dis-
cussing the decline in tax base for state and local governments due to a decline in con-
sumption and states' general unwillingness to increase taxes on corporations located
within their individual borders).
Ronald Snell, Director of the Economic and Fiscal Division of the National Conference
of State Legislatures noted that sales taxes, which are used mainly by the states to fund
public education, are "'shrinking as a portion of the gross national product."' Sheppard,
supra, at 455. Snell asserted that the Internet Tax Freedom Act would further erode al-
ready fragile tax bases. See id. Moreover, Snell refuted industry assertions that states are
enacting new taxes on the Internet. See id. Instead, he said states merely are trying to en-
force existing laws. See id.
245. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the massive lobbying cam-
paign on behalf of direct mailers to defeat similar legislation with respect to mail-order
sales).
246. Cf. supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the direct
mail industry on congressional efforts to pass legislation); see also Harriet Hanlon, MTC
Examines Making (Tax) Money on the Internet, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 408, 408 (1995)
("Because electronic sales are not an established industry as catalog sales are, the money
and power are not yet behind the industry, forestalling change."). The similarity of sales
and use tax issues among Internet vendors and mail-order merchants, however, may pres-
ent an opportunity for the direct mailers to shepherd Internet vendors' efforts to defeat
any legislation that would impose a new tax. See Forte, supra note 70, at 215-16.
247. See Carol Douglas, State Taxes in '97: The Once and Future Internet, 14 STATE
TAX NOTES 25, 25 (1998) (evidencing a belief that state and industry officials can work
together to fashion a solution that would not involve the Federal Government); Doug
Sheppard, National League of Cities Airs Concerns About Proposed Internet Act, 14
STATE TAX NOTES 271, 272 (1998) [hereinafter Sheppard II] (quoting National League of
Cities spokesman Randy Arndt, who stated that the efforts by state and local governments
and industry leaders are being "'sabotaged by preemptive legislation' such as the Internet
Tax Freedom Act").
At the very least, industry and government officials are establishing the parameters of
the ensuing debate, irrespective of Federal Government intrusion. See Sheppard, supra
note 244, at 455-56 (reporting on a seminar where business and government officials dis-
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"cooling off" period and require a commission to study the problem; or,
having acknowledged the states' right to tax the Internet, to get involved
248to develop a proper taxing regime.
As an alternative to enacting a moratorium, Congress could have en-
acted legislation overruling Bellas Hess and requiring an out-of-state
Internet vendor to collect a state's use tax on sales delivered into the
249taxing state. In so doing, Congress would stop short of jeopardizing
state sovereignty-states would be able to tax the Internet if they so
chose-yet would still provide assurances to Internet vendors as to their
legal obligations by establishing a de minimis exemption, or by mandat-
ing a uniform rate for all states.25°
cussed the ITFA). Charles E. McLure, Jr., of Stanford University's Hoover Institution,
has suggested that the solution to Internet taxation lies in three basic principles: uniform
definitions of what is to be taxed, establishment of an "economic presence" nexus stan-
dard, and elimination of sales and use tax liability on sales to businesses. See id. at 456.
Matthew N. Murray, of the University of Tennessee, has outlined eight points to consider
in approaching the problem: (a) "attentiveness in tax policy to the economic structure of
the industry"; (b) "consumer response to taxes"; (c) "tax base and revenue stability"; (d)
"changes on the 'sources' side of the budget (tax capacity and tax effort)"; (e) "changes on
the 'uses' side of the budget"; (f) "uneven burdens borne by providers of similar services";
(g) "administration and compliance costs"; and (h) "incidence and efficiency efforts."
Id.
248. See Douglas, supra note 247, at 25. Indeed, in an attempt to solve the problem
before the Federal Government intrudes, some states have been working with the direct
marketing industry to reach a mutual agreement. See id. Douglas suggests that public
outcry by direct-mail shoppers may have prevented such an agreement. See id.
The Tax Project has been working towards a resolution as well. See id. Despite the la-
bors of these groups, Professor Richard D. Pomp, of the University of Connecticut Law
school, suggests that there is little possibility that any agreement will defuse the legislation
moving through Congress. See id. Pomp has stated, "[iJf shch a bill passes, the states may
be limited to damage-control efforts." Id.
249. See Hartman, supra note 224, at 1015 (discussing similar legislation addressing
taxation of mail-order sales). Professor Hartman recognizes the problem of attendant
compliance costs associated with a law that places a collection and remittance burden on
the out-of-state vendor. See id. Hartman, however, suggests several methods by which
these compliance costs could be ameliorated. See id. at 1016. Congress could formulate a
de minimis rule which would exempt vendors whose sales did not meet a certain threshold
from tax collection responsibilities. See id. In the mail-order industry, Professor Hartman
found, small firms constitute the greatest number of businesses, but large firms sell the
most product; therefore, an exemption for small firms would have little effect on the
amount of revenue collected. See id. The analogy may not be easily transferrable to the
Internet industry, because the numbers Professor Hartman used were for mail-order
firms-a de minimis exemption level of five million dollars would exempt 96% of mail-
order firms, but the remaining 4% would account for 76% of mail-order revenue-and
Internet vendors may not be similarly distributed. See id. In the alternative, Congress
could address compliance burdens either by creating "a uniform combined state and local
tax rate for each state," or by permitting only the states to collect use taxes (thereby dis-
allowing local use tax assessment). Id.
250. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Focusing its efforts on the retail sales
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As a second alternative, Congress could refrain from overruling Bellas
Hess; instead, it could use its commerce power to impose a direct federal
tax on interstate Internet sales at a uniform rate and then distribute the
resulting revenues among the states." An obvious advantage to this ap-
proach is its relative simplicity, because Internet vendors would not need
to comply with the law of multiple state jurisdictions, but instead would
need only to know the federal rate.2 A federal tax, however, is the ulti-
mate intrusion into what is perceived by antitax legislators to be a state
and local problem, and its feasibility in the current political climate is
suspect at best."'
A third and final alternative, and one that has little intrusive effect,
would be a legislative attempt by Congress to permit the states to tax the
Internet upon satisfaction of due process requirements; physical presence
would not be required."' With the addition of a de minimis exemption
similar to that in the first alternative, such legislation would condition the
ability to tax on the occurrence of the sale within the taxing state and the
tax, the Tax Project states that its intention was to follow generally accepted policy objec-
tives in fashioning its proposal. See NTA Report, supra note 2, at 1256. The first such
commonly-held objective is "competitive equality"; that is, actors in Internet commerce
should be taxed the same as their counterparts in the traditional market. See id. Second,
the Tax Project submits that there is general agreement that state taxes should be uniform;
definitions of goods to be taxed and standards for establishing a nexus should be the same
in every state. See id. Third, it is generally accepted that any regime of Internet taxation
must be administratively feasible; if the tax is overly complex, or its compliance or admin-
istrative costs are unreasonable, "the tax 'will fail to serve its basic function as an effective
raiser of revenue."' Id. More than merely enumerating guiding principles of Internet
taxation, the Tax Project has proposed model legislation on which federal action could be
based. See id. at 1257-69.
From the outset, the proposal attempts to deal with the ambiguous nature of Internet
commerce by defining the term "sales tax," to include sales not only of tangible goods, but
intangible goods and services as well. See id. at 1257. The proposal offers alternatives in
determining a vendor's principal place of business: the place from which the business is
managed or directed, or the state in which it does most of its electronic commerce. See id.
at 1257-58. The proposal defines "billing address" as the place to which bills are sent, but
suggests an additional requirement that a portion of the goods sold over the Internet must
be used in the state where bills are sent. See id. at 1258. The Tax Project hopes that this
requirement will prevent businesses that buy over the Internet from establishing billing
addresses in tax-free states but using the product elsewhere. See id.
251. See Hartman, supra note 224, at 1017. Congress could set the tax rate and dis-
tribute the collected revenue among the states according to a formula for Internet sales
that could consider population, personal income, or in-state retail sales. See id.
252. See id. For this reason, the proposal to tax vendors on sales delivered into the
state generally is viewed as more feasible. See id.
253. See id.
254. See Gregory A. Ichel, Comment, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use Taxes:
States Continue to Scream Over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 660 (1997).
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purposeful and continuous actions of the vendor.255
At present, a moratorium might be preferable to adding to the number
of administrative problems that an out-of-state vendor might face if Con-
gress is unsure of the role it wants to assume and cannot find a politically
feasible or palatable option.256 The issue demands careful study across all
levels of government and, to the extent that the ITFA foments that dis-
cussion,"7 it should be supported.
IV. CONCLUSION
!tnternet commerce is an industry of almost limitless potential. As is
their constitutional right, states have moved to take advantage of this
new source of revenue. The nature of Internet commerce, however, does
not allow for an easy application of traditional Due Process and Com-
merce Clause analyses. However attenuated the connection between the
seller's actions and presence in the taxing state has become, requirements
of foreseeability, purposeful availment, and some degree of physical or
255. See id. During the 104th Congress, the Senate directed its efforts toward the
mail-order industry through the proposal of Senate Bill 480. See id. With little modifica-
tion however, Congress could use similar language to address Internet nexus issues. See
id. Senate Bill 480 suggested that the following jurisdictional requirements be met:
A State shall have power to require a person to collect a State sales [and/or use]
tax imposed with respect to the sale of tangible personal property if-
(1) the destination of sale is in such State, and
(2) such person [or corporation]-
engages in regular or systematic soliciting of sales in such State, and
during the 1-year period ending September 30 of the calendar year preceding the
calendar year in which the sale occurs, has gross receipts from the sale of such
tangible personal property-
(i) in the United States exceeding $12,500,000, or
(ii)in such State exceeding $500,000.
Id. at 661 n.88 (alteration in original). Ichel suggests that this legislation could be tailored
easily to encompass the Internet. See id. at 661. Thus, the legislation would cover the sale
of tangible personal property "commenced by utilizing a web site and Internet to advertise
and market their respective products in states other than that where they are domiciled
and/or incorporated." Id. at 661-62 n.89. Under Ichel's proposal, vendors would be liable
to pay the tax if their domestic sales totaled one billion dollars, or if in-state sales totaled
at least one million dollars. See id.
256. Cf. Morse, supra note 153, at 1132-33 (opining that legislative bodies generally
are hesitant to impose new taxes, and defer instead to administrative bodies.) But see
Ashraf, supra note 175, at 619 (noting that recent developments in software have made the
administrative task of calculating the tax rates of differing jurisdictions less cumbersome).
Software marketed under the name TAXWARE, "specifically designed for sales over the
Internet, can track sales and use tax rates [nationwide] through zip code information [that
may be] required of a customer before [the Internet] transaction" occurs. Id.
257. See H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. § 1102(a) (1998) (creating an advisory commission
comprised of federal, state, and local government representatives and industry leaders to
study Internet taxation).
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economic presence remain.
The federal government has an important role to play. Legislation that
definitively establishes jurisdiction and exempts businesses whose reve-
nue falls short of a certain threshold is optimal in that it preserves state
sovereignty while protecting Internet growth. If similar attempts to
regulate the mail-order industry are any indication, however, enacting
any legislation that imposes a burden on Internet vendors will be difficult
indeed. In that event, the ITFA has merit. Despite its shortcomings, the
period of careful study it offers can serve only to enhance national un-
derstanding of a global phenomenon-Internet commerce-that will
continue to grow exponentially in the future.
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